Abstract-Accurate load forecasting can create both economic and reliability benefits for power system operators. However, the cyberattack on load forecasting may mislead operators to make unsuitable operational decisions for the electricity delivery. To effectively and accurately detect these cyberattacks, this paper develops a machine learning-based anomaly detection (MLAD) methodology. First, load forecasts provided by neural networks are used to reconstruct the benchmark and scaling data by using the k-means clustering. Second, the cyberattack template is estimated by the naive Bayes classification based on the cumulative distribution function and statistical features of the scaling data. Finally, the dynamic programming is utilized to calculate both the occurrence and parameter of one cyberattack on load forecasting data. A widely used symbolic aggregation approximation method is compared with the developed MLAD method. Numerical simulations on the publicly load data show that the MLAD method can effectively detect cyberattacks for load forecasting data with relatively high accuracy. Also, the robustness of MLAD is verified by thousands of attack scenarios based on Monte Carlo simulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A CCURACY and correctness of load forecasting data can benefit both the economic and reliable operations of power systems. Power system operators highly depend on the load forecasting information to make operational decisions and plans under various power grid conditions. However, with the rapid adoption of modern technologies and the increasing capability of the attackers in recent years, more and more cyberattacks have been found and severely affect the reliability and security of power systems [1] . A recent representative blackout occurred against the Ukrainian power grid in December 2015 and caused serious power outages [2] . The malware is used by attackers to tamper the computer system of a power company and arbitrarily open breakers [3] . The restoration efforts are also delayed by attackers so as to induce this severe blackout which received worldwide attention [4] . Though current techniques have significantly improved the accuracy of load forecasting data, the operators may still make fallacious decisions when the forecasting data is tampered by highly skilled adversaries in a coordinated manner. From the prospective of time series data, there are three types of cyberattacks for load forecasts, namely point attacks, contextual attacks, and collective attacks [5] . From the prospective of the attackers' capability, there are five types of cyberattacks, namely pulse attack, scaling attack, ramping attack, random attack [6] , and smooth-curve attack [7] , which are described in the following statements.
The current detection methods mainly rely on identifying anomalies caused by cyberattacks for load forecasting data. Mohammadpourfard et al. [8] developed an unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm to identify cyberattacks in power systems that are affected by sustainable energy sources or system reconfigurations. Moghaddass and Wang [9] developed a real-time anomaly detection framework to detect the occurrence of anomalous events and abnormal conditions at both lateral and customer levels. Zhao et al. [10] proposed a false data injection detection method based on short-term state forecasting considering the temporal correlation. Chen et al. [11] presented a two-stage identification and restoration method for the inaccurate measurement and abnormal disturbance to improve the load forecasting accuracy.
Machine learning techniques have been widely used in the anomaly detection community. Buczak and Guven [12] described a focused literature survey of machine learning methods for cyber security anomaly detection. Ghafoori et al. [13] developed a semisupervised machine learning technique to clean suspected anomalies from unlabeled training sets including applications to the datasets of shuttle, breast cancer, human activity recognition, etc. In terms of the power system area, Wang et al. [14] trained a machine learning model to detect PMU data manipulation anomalies. Esmalifalak et al. [15] developed two machine-learning-based techniques for stealthy attack detection in the smart grid. However, there are very few applications to load forecasting by using machine learning techniques as detection methods.
As a widely-used anomaly detection method, a heuristically ordered time series based Symbolic Aggregation approXimation (SAX) [16] intends to identify the most unusual discords or sub-sequences in a sequence of given load forecasting data [7] . Though the SAX method performs consistently well to detect anomalies, it can raise more false alarm which may still confuse the practitioners for the application. In addition, since SAX detects an anomaly as the sub-sequence of load forecasts, it cannot provide any detailed information into this identified sub-sequence which is more helpful for practitioners, such as the specific occurrence and parameter of one cyberattack.
To bridge the gap between the SAX detection method and an informed method, this paper seeks to address two critical questions for load forecasting cyberattacks. Is it possible to determine the accurate start-and end-time information of one attack? Can the practitioners estimate the attack parameter if it is a parametric attack? To this end, this paper develops a novel machine learning based anomaly detection (MLAD) method to effectively identify cyberattacks for load forecasting data. This developed methods aims to improve the probability and success ratio of detection. The main contributions of this paper include: (i) determining the attack template by using a supervised machine learning method based on the reconstructed scaling data and (ii) estimating the specific occurrence and parameter information of one cyberattack.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, the templates of cyberattacks and load forecasts are briefly introduced. Section III presents the detailed methodology of MLAD, including data reconstruction in Section III-A, template determination in Section III-B, and dynamic programming in Section III-C. Section IV describes the evaluation metrics to validate the effectiveness of MLAD. Case studies and result analysis performed on the publicly load data are discussed in Section V. Concluding remarks are summarized in Section VII.
II. TEMPLATES OF CYBERATTACKS OF LOAD FORECASTS

A. Research Motivations
Load forecasting results are highly needed by power system operators and/or market participants to project upcoming grid conditions and make informed operational decisions. However, in recent years, there is a lack of understanding of how adversaries perform cyberattacks on load forecasting data and impact evaluations accordingly. As the cyber adversaries are increasingly skillful and sophisticated, it is more challenging to detect and mitigate those attacks that can do serious harm to power system operations. Thus, it is important to identify load forecasts tampered with by cyber adversaries before mitigation can be done [17] .
B. Cyberattack Templates
In this section, we are not aiming to develop new adversary models of cyberattack templates. The adversary models used in this paper are motivated by the particular adversary models referred in [6] and [7] . Inspired by existing adversary models for attacking automatic generation control (AGC), we assume that smart attackers could migrate these adversary models to those on load forecasting data in this paper. The cyber attacks for load forecasting are divided into five categories: pulse, scaling, ramping, random, and smooth-curve [6] , [7] , which are briefly described as follows. Note that this paper does not aim to develop new attack templates.
1) Pulse Attack: Load forecasts are modified to higher/lower values at a specific point during the entire duration of an attack. The attack parameter is set as λ P .
where t P is the occurrence time of one pulse attack. p F t is the original load forecast that is not tampered with any cyber attack.ṗ F t is the load forecast tampered with cyber attacks. 2) Scaling Attack: Scaling attacks involve modifying the values in a specified duration multiplied by a scaling attack parameter λ S .
where t s and t e represent the start-and end-time of one cyber attack, respectively.
3) Ramping Attack: There are two types of ramping attacks. Type I ramping attack only considers up-ramping anomaly. The values in the specified range are multiplied by a ramping function λ R t.
Type II ramping attack considers both up-and downramping anomalies. This attack is more challenging to detect for operators.
where · indicates the floored value which is used to present the approximate intermediate point between t s an t e .
4) Random Attack:
This attack involves the addition of positive values returned by a uniform random function to load forecasts.ṗ
where rand is a uniformly distributed random number generator that can be achieved by a built-in function in MATLAB. λ RA is a scale factor and defined as half of the maximum of load forecast value, i.e., λ RA = max(p F t )/2. The start-and end-time of one random attack is assumed to be randomly set by attackers.
5) Smooth-Curve Attack: Smooth-curve attacks are implemented by replacing the set of contiguous start and end points in the original forecasting data. In this paper, a polynomial fitting is used to generate a smooth curve and replace the original forecasting data with neighboring points.
C. Load Forecasts
There have been large amounts of load forecasting methods published in the current literature. However, it is very challenging to take advantage of each of them. Alternatively, if we can find a representative forecasting method that can be easily implemented by users and validate the effectiveness of this generic method for anomaly detection, advanced load forecasting methods must also be applicative. Based on this motivation, we choose a widely-used neural network (NN) method to perform load forecasting [18] . Note that this paper does not aim at developing new methods of load forecasting, which has been done in most papers. The input data sets of NN include: temperature and dew point (measuring humidity) forecast at time t + 1, the hour number of time t + 1 in the day (i.e., hour 1, 2, . . ., 24), days of the week (Monday through Sunday are presented by number 1, 2, . . ., 7), working days (yes or no), the load at the same hour of the previous day, the load at the same hour of the previous week, and the average load in the 24 hours prior to time t + 1. When cyber attackers tamper the essential input and output data of load forecasting, different attack templates may present depending on the capability of attackers, which has been described in Section II-B.
III. MACHINE LEARNING BASED ANOMALY DETECTION
The developed MLAD method mainly consists of three steps. The first step is to reconstruct the benchmark data corresponding to load forecasts. The second step is to determine the exact attack template based on the series of scaling data. The third step is to identify the specific occurrence and parameter information of one cyberattack.
A. Unsupervised Machine Learning Based Load Data Preprocessing
After generating the load forecasts mentioned in Section II-C, it is still challenging for operators to know whether these forecasts are attacked since the real load data is still unknown for the coming days (weeks or months). Thus, a benchmark series of load data is first reconstructed corresponding to the predicted load data. Since load data cannot be labeled with natural groupings and patterns, the data reconstruction is attributed to an unsupervised machine learning problem. There are several types of unsupervised machine learning algorithms, such as k-means, mixture models, and hierarchical clustering. Compared with mixture models and hierarchical clustering, the k-means clustering method is easy to implement [19] . With a large number of real load data, the k-means clustering method is computationally faster than the hierarchical clustering and mixture models. In addition, it can also produce tighter clusters than other unsupervised algorithms. Hence, the k-means clustering method is chosen as the unsupervised machine learning algorithm in this section and used to reconstruct the benchmark load data.
Given the training set of 24-dimensional daily load (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p j , . . . , p n ) in n days, the k-means clustering can partition n daily load into k load cluster sets, i.e.,
The objective is to minimize the within-cluster sum of squares [20] , given by:
where μ i is the mean of load data in the ith load cluster set s i and i = 1, 2, . . . , k. k is the total number of load cluster sets, which is predefined by operators. p j is the load data vector in the jth day and j = 1, 2, . . . , n. n is the total number of training days. The denotation of p j ∈ s i means that the jth day's load data vector p j is the element of the ith load cluster set s i .
Based on k clusters, the closest cluster is found for each load forecast scenario by minimizing the Euclidean distance, given by:
where
T is the reconstructed benchmark series, and
Based on the load forecasts and the reconstructed benchmark, the scaling data x t at time t can be calculated as:
where p F t is generated by the NN method in Section II-C. The scaling data is used to determine the specific attack template in the second step, as shown in Section III-B, and detect the accurate information of one attack in the third step, as shown in Section III-C.
B. Supervised Machine Learning Based Cyber Attack Templates Classification
Since cyber attacks are classified into five templates (or classes) with clear labels, this is taken as a supervised machine learning (classification) problem. There are several types of supervised machine learning algorithms, such as linear discriminant, logistic regression, perceptron, etc. The naive Bayes classifier is easy to implement with a low model size [21] . It requires a small amount of training load data with cyber attacks to estimate its parameters. A naive Bayes classifier can converge more quickly than discriminative models, which significantly shortens the training time. Also, it is not sensitive to irrelevant features. Thus, a naive Bayes classifier is chosen as the supervised machine learning algorithm in this section and trained by the measured statistical characteristics of the scaling data. Based on the widely used 68-95-99.7 rule (three-sigma rule) [22] , five statistical features are adapted as predictors of the multi-class naive Bayes model, i.e., x 0.3% , x 5% , x 68% , x 95% , and x 99.7% . The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the scaling data is used to generate main statistical features due to its monotonicity. Fig. 1 shows an example of three statistical features (x 5% , x 68% , and x 95% ) of two CDFs of the scaling data. Fig. 1a shows how the scaling values in the x-axis are generated from single CDF curves for scaling attack (orange curve) and ramping attack (blue curve). Fig. 1b shows how the training samples of three representative statistical features are generated from CDF clusters, where CDFs with scaling attacks (orange curves) and ramping attacks (blue curves) are taken as an example. Essentially, the discrete statistical features are used to approximately represent the continuous CDF curves. Thus, the naive Bayes classifier only has five input variables (i.e., five statistical features of CDF curves: x 0.3% , x 5% , x 68% , x 95% , and x 99.7% ), which makes it easy to implement. To quantitatively present the difference of CDF curves with different attacks, some samples of statistical features for five types of cyber attacks are shown in Table I . As can be seen, the difference of statistical features with the same type of attacks is significantly small, while it differs between different types of attacks, such as pulse and ramping attacks. Thus, this observation can be used to train the naive Bayes classifier and thereby determine the specific template used to launch a cyber attack on the testing data. As can be seen, these statistical features have different values in the x-axis and can be used as predictors of the naive Bayes model. To accurately characterize the irregular and multimodal distribution of the scaling data, Gaussian mixture model (GMM) is used to fit the distributions [23] , and generates both the CDFs and statistical features. Based on predictors generated by the CDF of GMM, the naive Bayes classifier is constructed from the probability model with the objective of the maximum posterior probabilityP(·), given by:
where is the set of statistical features and is the set of attack templates. π(A = a) is the prior probability of the attack template a. P(X = x j |A = a) is the conditional probability of the jth statistical feature x j given attack template a. Since values of the feature x j and labels of the attack template a are all given, the denominator in (10) is effectively constant. Hence, the objective function is equivalent to only maximizing the numerator in (10), which is the joint probability model in (11) . Fig. 2a shows an example of the posterior probability regions for three cyberattacks using the naive Bayes classifier. As can be seen, the rectangles (ramping attacks), triangles (random attacks), and circles (scaling attacks) can be distinctly classified by using the naive Bayes classifier.
C. Dynamic Programming 1) Methodology Description:
Dynamic programming method is used to detect the exact occurrence (start and end points) of one cyber attack and its specific parameters by solving an objective function. The simultaneous detection of such information is much challenging by using other methods. For example, the signal processing methods, such as wavelet decomposition [24] and empirical model decomposition [25] , can only roughly detect the occurrence of a disturbance. The parameters of cyber attacks, such as the scaling attack parameter λ S and the ramping attack parameter λ R , remain unidentified by practitioners. Essentially, these methods transform the original data to a predefined metric, such as the normalized wavelet energy (NWE) [26] , based on a relatively narrow sliding window. During this transformation process, the detailed information of the original data may be lost. Thus, to detect both the occurrence and parameters of a cyber attack, dynamic programming method is chosen and briefly introduced in this section. Dynamic programming is a method for solving a complex problem by breaking it down into a collection of simpler subproblems [27] . The time intervals must comply with the anomaly rules described as follows.
The anomaly rule under cyberattacks is predefined by practitioners and required for the developed MLAD method based on the scaling data. Fig. 2b shows an example of the scaling data for the ramping attack template. Generally, one cyber attack consists of one upward stroke (the red dash line) and one downward stroke (the green dash line). For pulse, scaling, and ramping (Type II) attacks, there are one significant upward stroke (SUS) and one significant downward stroke (SDS). For random and smooth-curve attacks, there may exist multiple upward and downward strokes. Given that the total number of SUS and SDS is M, the key of the MLAD method is to detect the initial SUS (ST 1 ) and the terminal SDS (ST M ). Assuming that the set of strokes is S = {ST 1 , . . . , ST m , . . . , ST M }, where (s m , e m ) represents the mth significant stroke with the corresponding start point (s m ) and end point (e m ), the magnitude rule R mag checks whether the scaling data has increased (or decreased) by a specified threshold Tr mag , and defined as: (13) where x s m and x e m indicate the scaling data at time s m and e m , respectively. Based on the predefined anomaly rule, time intervals that satisfy the magnitude rule are rewarded by a score function; otherwise, their score is set to zero. An increasing length score function S is designed based on the length of time intervals. Given a time interval (i, j) of discrete time points of scaling data and a time point k located into this interval (i.e., i < k < j), the score function should conforms to a super-additivity property, given by:
There are a family of score functions that can satisfy this property. In this paper, the score function presented in [28] and [29] is adopted and given by:
where R(i, j) represents the magnitude rule in (13) . Then, an objective function J is constituted according to the dynamic programming, given by: For the mth non-strokes, the magnitude rule, score function, and objective function of the dynamic programming can respectively be calculated as:
For the mth time interval with SUS or SDS, i.e., ST m = (s m , e m ), the magnitude rule, score function, and objective function of the dynamic programming can respectively be calculated by: 
Finally, the application of dynamic programming will yield the set of SUS and SDS of cyberattacks for load forecasting data, i.e., S = {ST 1 , . . . , ST m , . . . , ST M }.
2) Discussion of Computational Complexity Reduction:
To efficiently solve the dynamic programming based problem, the predefined magnitude rule R mag in (13) can significantly reduce the computational complexity of dynamic programming. This is because both the score function and the objective function of time intervals (or sub-intervals) that cannot conform to the magnitude rule R mag are calculated as zero, which are formulated in (17)- (19) . That is to say, only these time intervals that can conform to the magnitude rule R mag can be assigned with a specific nonzero score by the score function that is formulated in (20)- (22) . Finally, only very few intervals with strokes (usually one or two strokes) are assigned with a score, namely the cyber attacks to be detected. Though the number of steps k may be relatively large, the number of cyber attacks is significantly small. It means that most of time intervals without cyber attacks are assigned with zero values. Thus, during this recursive process of dynamic programming, its computational complexity can be significantly reduced.
3) Determination of Magnitude Threshold: The magnitude threshold Tr mag in (13) can be automatically determined from the historical load dataset under the normal condition. First, practitioners can readily gather the maximum magnitude of increment M Norm max from the normal scaling dataset. However, the maximum magnitude M Norm max may change along with the corresponding normal scaling dataset that practitioners choose. Thus, a tolerance value is added and defined as a small proportion of the maximum magnitude M Norm max of the normal scaling dataset. Finally, we can get the formulation of the magnitude threshold, given by:
Norm max
Tolerance Value (25) where φ mag is the tolerance coefficient of the magnitude threshold. Based on the experimental experience, φ mag can be chosen in the range of 10%-20%. This formulation can guarantee that the normal increment of load scaling data is not contained by the defined magnitude threshold Tr mag .
D. Procedure of the Developed MLAD Method
To accurately detect the occurrence of cyberattacks, the flowchart of the developed MLAD methodology is shown in Fig. 3 . Three major steps are briefly summarized, including.
• Step 1: The load forecast data p F t is generated by NN and put into the k-means clustering model, which has been trained by the training set of load data, to reconstruct the benchmark data p B t and the scaling data x t . • Step 2: Statistical features of the scaling data are used as inputs of the naive Bayes classifier to determine the specific template of one attack. For each estimated attack template, parameters of the dynamic programming have been predefined by practitioners. • Step 3: Dynamic programming is used to estimate the final occurrence and parameter of one cyber attack by maximizing the objective function. Evaluation metrics introduced in the following section are calculated to evaluate the detection performance.
IV. EVALUATION METRICS OF DETECTION PERFORMANCE
A. Metrics I: Numerical Detection Errors
To numerically evaluate the performance of different detection methods for cyberattacks, two metrics are used for comparison, namely mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and root mean square error (RMSE), and given by: (27) where N S is total number of possible attack scenarios. A i and D i is the actual and detected information (start-time, end-time, and attack parameters) of the ith attack scenario, respectively. Smaller MAPE and RMSE indicate that the corresponding method produces more accurate detected information of cyberattacks.
B. Metrics II: Visualized Detection Performance
Table II provides a measure of skill based on a contingency table [30] for comparison. Assuming that sets of 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 ∩ 1 , which means the start-time must be located into 1 and the end-time must be located into 1 ; false positive (FP) is the number of detected attacks of which the starttime is pre-detected or the end-time is post-detected within tolerance values, and FP ∈ ( 1 ∩ 2 )∪( 2 ∩ 1 )∪( 2 ∩ 2 ); false negative (FN) is the number of detected attacks of which the start-time is post-detected or the end-time is pre-detected within tolerance values, and
; and true negative (TN) is the number of attacks that are inaccurately detected in excess of a larger tolerance φ 2 , and TN = N S − TP − FP − FN. FP attacks can cause false alarms for users with redundant operations. FN attacks are missed by the detection method with insufficient operations for users. The performance diagram is visualized by metrics including the probability of detection (POD), critical success index (CSI), frequency bias score (FBIAS), and success ratio (SR), given by:
Detailed information about the performance diagram and metrics can be found in [31] .
V. CASE STUDIES AND RESULTS
The raw load data are obtained directly from ISO New England [32] . Hourly load data is sampled on the Table III . Fig. 5-Fig. 7 compare the detection results of multiple representative cyberattacks using SAX (left column) and MLAD (right column). Fig. 5 compares the detection results of one scaling attack. The latter part of the scaling attack cannot be detected by SAX. Fig. 6 compares the detection results of one Type II ramping attack. The front part of the scaling attack cannot be detected by SAX. Fig. 7 compares the detection results of one random attack. Similar with the scaling attack, SAX cannot detect the front part of the random attack. Overall, SAX cannot accurately detect a complete cyberattack. This is because the SAX method only identifies a sub-sequence of the sliding window size (n s ) as anomalies, which may always include some normal data points and neglect some anomaly data points. The MLAD method can accurately detect cyberattacks for load forecasting data. Another interesting finding is that MLAD is also capable of detecting both the up-and downramping anomalies for the Typer II ramping attack as seen in Fig. 6b . The up-ramping anomalies are marked with black rectangles, and down-ramping anomalies are marked with blue rectangles.
A. Performance Evaluation of the Proposed Method
B. Robustness Analysis Using Monte Carlo Simulation
The Monte Carlo simulation coupled with Latin hypercube sampling (LHS) [33] is used for the robustness analysis of the developed MLAD method. LHS is often used to construct computer experiments for Monte Carlo integration. First, LHS generates five positive integer lhs (5) , where · indicates rounding towards plus infinity. Each integer represents a cyberattack template: 1→pulse, 2→scaling, 3→ramping, 4→random, and 5→smooth-curve. A cyberattack is chosen by randomly sampling a positive integer. Second, for each attack scenario, an attack randomly tampers the load forecasting data at any time in 14 days (336 points). The total number of attack scenarios is set as 3,000. of those are confused with random attacks. As can be seen, smooth-curve attacks are the most challenging to detect. This is mainly because this attack template is very secretive and presents a smooth curve together with neighboring data points at the beginning and end of the load forecasting data. Table V compares the MAPE values of the SAX and MLAD methods for cyberattacks' occurrence. Three types of SAX methods with the best performance are used for comparison: SAX-I (n s = 30), SAX-II (n s = 32), and SAX-III (n s = 34). As can be seen, SAX cannot be used to detect any pulse attacks as their ultrashort discretized duration (1 point) does not significantly affect the relatively long sliding window (28∼32 points). This similar phenomenon has also been verified in [7] . However, MLAD can accurately detect the occurrence of pulse attacks with the smallest MAPE value of 0.005%, which is mainly due to the confusion of smooth-curve attacks shown in Table IV . For scaling, ramping, and random attacks, MLAD can detect the start-and end-time of cyberattacks with the smallest MAPE (1%∼3%), compared with three types of SAX methods (8%∼32%). For the smooth-curve attack, MLAD can still work better than SAX methods, though the MAPE value of MLAD is relatively larger than that for other attacks. Also, this observation verifies that smooth-curve attacks are the most challenging to detect since the start-and end-time of these attacks are disguised very well.
C. Impacts of Load Forecasting Accuracy on Anomaly Detection Performance
To analyze the impacts of load forecasting accuracy on the anomaly detection performance of different methods, the normalized root mean square errors (NRMSE) is used to represent the load forecasting accuracy. A smaller NRMSE value indicates a higher load forecasting accuracy. Three NRMSEs, i.e., 1.68%, 3.36%, and 5.04%, are used for comparison and analysis. An interesting advantage of the developed MLAD method is that it can be used to estimate parameters of both scaling and ramping attacks. Though SAX methods have been widely used to detect collective anomalies, it intends to only identify a sub-sequence from the attacked load forecasting data. However, the detailed information among this identified subsequence, especially for the attack parameter, is still unknown for practitioners using SAX. When using MLAD, as the initial SUS (ST 1 = (s 1 , e 1 ) ) and the terminal SDS (ST M = (s M , e M )) have been accurately detected by dynamic programming, the estimated attack parameterλ can be calculated by:
Table VI illustrates the sensitivity of estimated parameters of both scaling and ramping attacks under three NRMSE conditions. As can be seen, estimated parameters of both scaling attack ( λ S ) and ramping attack ( λ R ) present relatively high accuracies. The MAPE metrics are in the range of 9.26%∼17.92% and 9.59%∼14.45%, respectively. The RMSE metrics are in the range of 6.62%∼13.36% and 9.23%∼10.80%, respectively. In addition, the accuracy of estimated parameters increases with the decrease of load forecasting errors, which means the estimation accuracy is sensitive to the load forecasting performance. In other words, the improvement of load forecasts can significantly enhance the accuracy of estimated attack parameters. Fig. 8 shows the visualized performance diagram for comparison of SAX and MLAD with different NRMSEs. Two types of SAX with the best performance are chosen for comparison, i.e., SAX-I (n s = 30) and SAX-II (n s = 32). For a performance diagram shown in Fig. 8, 1 ) the left axis represents the value of POD; 2) the bottom axis represents SR; 3) the diagonal dashed lines represent FBIAS; and 4) the dashed curves represent CSI. For a better performance, the points should be close toward the top right corner of the performance diagram. Four sets of thresholds are predefined based on different values of the smaller tolerance φ 1 and the larger tolerance φ 2 , i.e., Thr.-1: φ 1 = 5, φ 2 = 10; Thr.-2: φ 1 = 4, φ 2 = 9; Thr.-3: φ 1 = 3, φ 2 = 8; and Thr.-4: φ 1 = 2, φ 2 = 7. Fig. 8 demonstrates the good detection performance of the developed MLAD method compared with SAX methods. The rectangles (detected by MLAD) are closer to the top right corner than circles (detected by SAX-I) and triangles (detected by SAX-II). For different load forecasting errors, the developed MLAD method performs better than any SAX method. Specifically, when using MLAD, the mean SR value (bottom x-axis) with three NRMSEs is 0.88, whereas the mean SR values using SAX-I and SAX-II are 0.72 and 0.58, respectively. Moreover, when using MLAD, the mean POD value (left y-axis) with three NRMSEs is 0.96, whereas the mean POD values using SAX-I and SAX-II are 0.79 and 0.76, respectively. This phenomenon shows that the developed MLAD method is robust to the load forecasting accuracy which can be easily achieved by most current load forecasting techniques. In addition, for most cases in Fig. 8 , the pink points with the largest threshold (Thr.-1) are closer to the top right corner, whereas the blue points with the smallest threshold (Thr.-4) are closer to the bottom left corner. As larger thresholds can generate wider ranges of sets of 1 , 2 , 3 , 1 , 2 , and 3 in Fig. 4 , more detected points are counted as true positive points. This observation can verify the effectiveness of the performance diagram.
D. Impacts of Advanced Load Forecasting Method
To guarantee the universality and generalization of the developed MLAD, the widely used conventional NN is taken as a representative example of load forecasting methods since it can be readily implemented by practitioners who are not experts in the load forecasting research area. That is to say, if the developed MLAD could be applicable to the conventional NN forecasting method with a relatively larger RMSE, it should be readily applicable to the advanced load forecasting method with a relatively smaller RMSE. To validate this, an advanced similar day-based wavelet neural network (SIWNN) method is used to improve the load forecasting performance. Detailed information about SIWNN can be found in [34] . The information of training and testing data is the same as that of the conventional NN method. Table VII illustrates the performance of two load forecasting methods (conventional NN and SIWNN) based on estimated parameters of both scaling and ramping attacks. As can be seen, when using the improved SIWNN forecasting method, estimated parameters of both scaling attack ( λ S ) and ramping attack ( λ R ) present relatively high accuracies with smaller MAPE and RMSE values. While using the conventional NN forecasting method, estimated parameters present relatively low accuracies. For the scaling attack, the MAPE metric is reduced by 33.68% [=(15.41%−10.22%)/15.41%] after using SIWNN. For the ramping attack, the MAPE metric is reduced by 26.8% [=(12.24% − 8.96%)/12.24%] after using SIWNN. This observation shows that the improved SIWNN method can enhance the accuracy of estimated attack parameters.
VI. DISCUSSION
The aforementioned research mainly considers cyber attacks performed on load forecasting results through the anomaly detection model. However, it is possible that adversaries may tamper with the anomaly detection model and subsequently the detection result itself. Under this circumstance, a layered defense model can be added into the developed architecture of assessing the impact and evaluate the response to cybersecurity issues, as shown in Fig. 9 . In the layered defense step, the anomaly detection output is compared with the forecast output. If there is any evident difference, it means the anomaly detection model is manipulated and remedial actions should be taken on procedures of load forecasts, anomaly detection, and grid operations. Then, an alternative anomaly detection model is enabled and used to replace the manipulated one. Otherwise, if there is no difference, the anomaly detection model is cybersecure while remedial actions should be taken on procedures of load forecasts and grid operations. It should be recognized that any detection means is breakable, no matter how well designed, and the attacked data may be passed to and used in the grid operation. It is important to have additional layers of defenses to minimize the impacts in the operation stage if this happens, e.g., the attacked data may be crosschecked using state estimation information or PMU measurements.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper develops a machine learning based anomaly detection (MLAD) method for load forecasting under cyberattacks. The predicted load data is first used to reconstruct the benchmark and scaling data by using the k-means clustering. The naive Bayes classification is then used to determine the specific attack template. Finally, the dynamic programming is utilized to calculate both the occurrence and the parameter of one cyberattack on load forecasting data. Compared with the widely-used SAX method, the effectiveness and robustness of the developed MLAD method is verified by numerical simulations on the publicly load data. Some universal and common lessons are shown as follows:
(i) The detailed occurrence and parameter information of the cyberattacks could be detected with a considerably high accuracy by using MLAD. (ii) The developed MLAD method is robust to the load forecasting errors with a relatively high success ratio. (iii) The improvement of load forecasts can significantly enhance the accuracy of estimated attack parameters. The developed MLAD method is not able to find the specific derivations of the cyberattacks, e.g., the broken topology of the forecasting model, falsified parameters of forecasting methods, or attacked pre-processing techniques. In the future, this research can also be further improved by analyzing the sensitivities of different load forecasting methods with the load data tampered with cyber attacks.
